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This study examines the role that Islamic law has played thus far in reforming the 
Moroccan Family Code, also known as the Moudawana. When King Mohammed VI reformed 
this law in 2004, Morocco received immediate international praise for its liberal strides towards 
gender equality. Through this study I investigated the hermeneutical tools and methods of ijtihad 
employed both by the drafters of the Moudawana and by activists leading up to the 2004 
reforms. I then investigate impediments to the implementation of this Code in providing 
substantive legal rights to Moroccan women and the role that interpretation of Islamic law plays 
in these barriers. I will also situate this in larger debates concerning the role of CSOs in 
authoritarian regimes, the international regime’s conception of universal human rights and state 
control of religion. Finally, this study examines the strengths and challenges facing the Islamic 
feminist movement and assesses the potential for this movement to produce further reforms to 
the Moudawana and increase gender equality in Moroccan society.  
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 On March 12, 2000, mass demonstrations took place in both Rabat and Casablanca in 
reaction to Morocco’s National Plan for the Integration of Women in Development (Zoglin 
2009). In Rabat, 300,000 people demonstrated in support of the plan, while in Casablanca, over 
one million protested in opposition (Hursh 2012). The Rabat demonstrators consisted of both 
secular and religious women’s rights groups, international human rights organizations, unions, 
and government ministers. Meanwhile, the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) mobilized 
conservative Islamist groups and traditionalists to protest the plan in Casablanca (Zoglin 2009). 
Many conservative women participated in the Casablanca march as well (Maddy-Weitzman 
2005). Islamists viewed the plan as a Western attempt to secularize Moroccan society, arguing 
that the it was fundamentally incompatible with the values of Islam. However, women’s rights 
groups argued that the plan adhered to ideals of equality and justice laid out by the Qur’an. These 
opposing sides cited different interpretations of and verses from the Qur’an in order to justify 
their arguments that the plan was either in line with or antithetical to Islam (Zoglin 2009). These 
groups’ attempt to base their political advocacy in Islamic law or shari’a is representative of the 
way in which the debate surrounding women’s rights in Morocco is grounded in hermeneutics.  
 King Mohammed VI responded to the public dispute by creating a Royal Commission to 
re-examine Morocco’s Personal Status Code or Family Code, the only piece of Moroccan 
legislation based on shari’a. The King directed the Commission to review the code based on 
Islamic legal reasoning known as ijtihad and the principles of universal human rights (Zoglin 
2009). Parliament adopted the new Family Code, also known as the Moudawana, in January of 
2004. The reforms to the code increased women’s equality in matters of marriage, divorce, child 
custody, and several other aspects of family life.  
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 In this study, I will examine the role interpretation that Islamic law has played 
thus far in reforming the Family Code and to what extent these reforms have fundamentally 
expanded women’s rights in Morocco. I will then analyze the methods of ijtihad promoted by 
Islamic feminists as a mechanism by which activists can further address the challenges 
Moroccan women still face in family law proceedings. I selected this topic based on a ‘conflict’ 
consistently presented in my coursework on international relations and Islamic studies. My past 
professors argued that liberal ideals such as democratization and gender equality can only be 
achieved through secularization, and, therefore, are fundamentally incompatible with and 
antithetical to Islam. In the context of this framework, democratization efforts or women’s rights 
movements were considered to be solely the product of the neocolonial imposition of Western 
values on Muslim societies. Through this study, I wanted to learn both how religious law could 
translate into the laws of Morocco as a nation-state and investigate the ways in which Moroccan 
Muslim women seek to establish their legal rights not in spite of but based on the values of 
Islam.  
In this study, I interviewed experts, Moroccan politicians and government officials, and 
Islamic feminists and activists. I based my work in grounded theory, a theory generated solely 
from the data I collected in this study.  
Part I of this study provides a history of the Moroccan women’s rights movement. Part II 
includes a literature review of the recent publications that analyze this topic. Part III explains the 
methodology employed in my study. Part IV presents the findings of my research concerning the 
role of shari’a in the creation of the new Family Code. Part V assesses the successes and 
challenges involved in the implementation of this code. Finally, in Part VI, I will propose that the 
reinterpretation of Islamic law through a feminist lens as practiced by contemporary Islamic 
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feminists offers a way of expanding women’s rights through a homegrown movement, grounded 
in religion. In this final section, I will assess the strengths and limitations of the Islamic feminist 
movement.  
 
Part I: Historical Overview 
Islamic law played a critical role in the Moroccan struggle for independence (Hursh 
2012). Islam served as one of the strongest forces for anti-colonial resistance across the Middle 
East North Africa region. In response to French colonial occupation, the Moroccan independence 
movement emphasized Morocco’s Islamic character. As the only piece of legislation based on 
Islamic law, the Family Code became the most important symbol of Morocco’s identity as a 
Muslim nation.  
King Mohammad V instituted Morocco’s first Family Code by royal decree in 1957, the 
year of Moroccan independence (Zoglin 2009). The King based the code on the Maliki school of 
Islamic jurisprudence (Maddy-Weitzman 2005). Under this code, women could not consent to 
marriage without the permission of an appointed wali or tutor, who had legal authority over her 
decisions. Women were also unable to initiate divorce proceedings (Zoglin 2009). A man not 
only had the sole right to divorce his wife, but was also not required to receive judicial approval 
for the divorce. During the rise of Islamism during the 1980s and 90s, Moroccan women’s rights 
organizations began to ground their arguments in new readings of the Qur’an and hadith in order 
to advocate for reforms to the Family Code. In 1992, l’Union de l’Action Féminine (UAF) 
launched the One Million Signatures campaign, a petition advocating for changes to the Family 
Code. The called for several reforms, including the establishment of equal status of spouses, a 
woman’s right to initiate divorce proceedings, and the abolition of martial guardianship and 
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polygamy (Eddouada 2010). The text of this petition stated that it was based on international 
human rights agreements and maqasid al-shari’a, meaning the spirit of the canonical texts of 
Islam. In particular, the UAF emphasized Morocco’s ratification of the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Despite backlash from 
the conservative ulama and the Islamist parties, the petition sparked public debate on the issue. 
In response to this pressure, King Hassan II established a commission, composed solely of male 
judges and religious leaders, to reevaluate the Family Code. In 1993, the King issued a royal 
decree that instituted a few modest changes to the code. These changes placed some restrictions 
on the power of the wali and required a husband to notify his first wife before he married a 
second wife. Although these reforms were limited, they demonstrated that the code was not a 
sacred, fixed piece of legislation but rather one that had the potential to be reformed.  
When King Mohammed VI assumed the throne in 1999, he promised to increase gender 
equality in Moroccan society. In March of that year, the Prime Minister announced the National 
Plan for the Integration of Women in Development. This plan included changes to healthcare and 
education systems and political and economic reforms as well as changes to the 1993 Family 
Code (Zoglin 2009). The public reacted to the proposed reforms with the aforementioned 
demonstrations in Rabat and Casablanca. The fact that the World Bank sponsored the plan led 
Islamists to argue that the reforms represented a neo-colonial attempt to secularize Moroccan 
society. Thousands of women protested with the Islamists in Casablanca. Nadia Yassine, head of 
the feminist branch of the Islamist Party of Justice and Benevolence stated that the 
demonstrators’ organizers did not object to increased legal rights for women, but rather to the 
language of universal human rights in which the reforms were presented (Eddouada 2010). 
Islamist parties such as the PJD criticize Morocco’s adherence to international human and 
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women’s rights treaties, arguing that the idea of equality between the sexes is fundamentally 
incompatible with Islam. Islamist women reject the idea of absolute gender equality as they 
believe that Islam designates particular roles and rights to each gender. For example, according 
to Islamist women, Islam assigns women the role of motherhood. Thus, these groups focus on 
the rights of the mother such as maternity leave, but object to reforms that do not directly aid 
women in this specific role.  
The King’s Royal Commission consisted of religious scholars, sociologists, judges, and 
doctors. The King appointed three women to the Royal Commission, for the first time allowing 
women to formally partake in the reform debate. The Royal Commission conducted its work in 
three phases (Zoglin 2009). First, it heard presentations from representatives of different sectors 
of civil society. Next, it reviewed the family laws of other Muslim-majority countries. Finally, 
the Royal Commission debated the underlying framework for the laws. Some members argued 
that the new code should be informed by international human rights treaties, while others 
emphasized the need to ground the new code in shari’a. At the conclusion of these debates, the 
Royal Commission passed its recommendations to the King. Rather than issue the reforms via 
royal decree as the previous kings had done, King Mohammed VI presented the reforms to 
Parliament in October of 2003. After extensive debate and over 100 amendments, the Parliament 
adopted the Moudawana.  
Part II: Literature Review 
Previous publications covering the 2004 Moudawana reforms analyze both the contents 
of the reforms and the manner in which they were produced. Some publications debate whether 
or not the way in which the government created these reforms indicates a step towards 
 10 
democratization in Morocco. Other publications analyze whether or not King Mohammed VI has 
created these reforms solely to gain favor with Western nations, without the intent of producing 
substantive change. These works situate the 2004 Moudawana reforms in the context of larger 
debates about the political phenomenon unfolding in the Middle East North Africa region today. 
I will provide a brief summary of these works in this section.  
International actors, particularly in the West, applauded the Moudawana reforms for both 
their progressive contents and for the seemingly open public debate surrounding the issue at the 
time. The media and political analysts commended the fact that the Moroccan government 
allowed for mass demonstrations on both sides of the political spectrum and the fact that Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs) managed to set the political agenda as their activism ultimately 
led to substantial reforms. However, authors Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley (2006) argue 
that the unilateral institution of reforms by the palace indicates that just as the monarchy has the 
power to implement reforms, it has the power to remove them. These authors highlight the fact 
that, despite the liberal nature of the reforms and the responsiveness of the King to the public’s 
demands, Morocco still lacks a political mechanism that ensures the people have a say in the 
legislation that governs them. Although CSO activism and the enormous turnout at both the 
Rabat and Casablanca protests set the agenda for the regime to reexamine the Family Code, the 
King had the ultimate say on the direction reforms would take. Furthermore, Francesco 
Cavatorta and Emanuela Dalmasso (2009) propose that CSO activism can actually reinforce 
authoritarian practices rather than leading to democratization. Dominant democratic theory 
argues that an active civil society directly correlates to increased democratization. However, 
these authors propose that CSOs operating under authoritarian regimes ultimately reinforce the 
strength of these regimes. Authoritarian regimes place constraints on CSOs such that they cannot 
 11 
openly criticize the regime but rather are forced to work with it in order to achieve their policy 
objectives. The fact that the regime and its associates are the only members of society capable of 
delivering substantive policy changes, particularly in the field of family law, forces CSOs to 
cultivate relationships with the regime rather than with elected representatives, resulting in the 
development of patronage networks. Amaney Jamal seconds this assertion, arguing that CSOs 
under authoritarian regimes develop clientelism (Hursh 2012). Cavatorta, Dalmasso, and Jamal 
all apply this framework to the process by which the King instituted reforms to the Moudawana 
in their publications. In the 1990s, when the UAF launched its One Million Signatures campaign, 
the organization aimed its efforts directly at the prime minister and members of parliament. The 
organization sought to link their efforts for increased gender equality to broader political reform 
and democratization. Cavatorta and Dalmasso argue that the limited reforms made to the 1993 
Family Code signaled to CSOs that the UAF’s strategy had been ineffective; the only way to 
bring about substantive change was by appealing to the regime itself. Therefore, in the early 
2000s, women’s rights organizations worked directly with the monarchy rather than with 
Parliament. The authors propose that these organizations not only came to recognize the limits of 
Parliament’s power but also the fact that the majority of Moroccans, to whom elected 
representatives are accountable, did not support the proposed reforms. Therefore, the women’s 
rights movement appealed directly to the King as he had the power to institute liberal yet 
unpopular reforms. Jamal argues that Moroccan civil society “supports [the] overall conclusion 
that not all associations are beneficial to democracy” (Hursh 2012). She continues to state that 
the King has co-opted these organizations in order to advance his own political objectives. The 
CSOs successfully forced international pressure on the regime to implement these reforms, but 
 12 
the nature of the relationship between CSOs and the regime in Moroccan society forces CSOs to 
adopt pro-regime policies.  
 Cavatorta and Dalmasso (2009) also propose that the King instituted these reforms 
primarily in order to gain favor from the international community. The World Bank financed the 
National Plan for the Integration of Women in Development, and the King had already labeled 
economic development and women’s rights as his top priorities. The authors propose that the 
King utilized the Moudawana reforms for international leverage as part of a broader plan for 
neo-liberal economic development. They argue that the King instituted the reforms in order to 
gain the economic and political benefits of presenting Morocco as a ‘liberal country.’ These 
authors cite the fact that the monarchy has displayed little interest in implementing the reforms 
on the ground. Souad Eddouada and Renata Pepicelli (2010) also propose that the monarchy 
reformed the Moudawana for both domestic and international political purposes. These authors 
formulate their argument through a comparative analysis of the Islamist movement and the 
feminist movement leading up to the reforms. Eddouada and Pepicelli argue that the state 
attempted to reconcile both movements by creating “Islamic state feminism.” In this move, the 
state effectively co-opted both movements simultaneously.  
 These authors, alongside several others analyzing the subject, also draw a connection 
between the regime’s reform of the Moudawana and the 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks. 
Alongside the Moudawana reforms, the regime began to actively promote what it identified as a 
uniquely moderate form of Islam. Based on the concept of Moroccan exceptionalism, the regime 
promoted the idea that Moroccan Islam is more tolerant and accepting of women than Islam in 
other parts of the world and established religious institutions to spread this vision. Eddouada and 
other authors also suggest that the regime established this project in order to both address 
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domestic tensions and demonstrate to the international community that Moroccan Islam is 
fundamentally different from extremist versions of Islam that are prevalent in other parts of the 
world (Eddouada 2010). Serida Lucrezia Catalano (2011) also proposes that the regime was only 
able to gain the PJD’s support for the Moudawana reforms because of the Casablanca attacks. 
Despite the fact that the Islamists unanimously rejected the National Plan for the Integration of 
Women in Development, the party switched course and supported the 2004 reforms. Catalano 
proposes that, although the PJD was not involved in the terrorist attacks, shifts in the electorate 
after the attacks ensured that the King would be able to institute his reforms without the political 
backlash of the Islamists.  
 
Part III: Methodology 
For this study, I wanted to understand the role hermeneutics has played in the creation 
and implementation of this law as well as in both past and current activism seeking to reform it. 
Therefore, I chose to interview participants from a variety of different sectors in order to 
understand the hermeneutics at play at multiple different levels. I primarily spoke with experts 
on the subject, government officials, politicians, and Islamic feminists, who are seeking to 
reinterpret the Qur’an through a feminist lens. Unfortunately, I was unable to interview any 
family court judges in Morocco. Therefore, the section of my study that analyzes ongoing 
challenges with the implementation of this code is comprised of previously published studies and 
interviews with experts on the subject. I set up meetings with my participants via email and then 
spoke to them on their preferred online platform (either Zoom, Cisco Webex, or WhatsApp). 
Technical difficulties with audio and internet connection presented challenges in these 
interviews, but my participants and I were generally able to complete our interviews via various 
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methods of online communication. All of my participants were low risk. I obtained oral consent 
from each participant to have their name printed in this study. I also obtained their oral consent 
to use the material from our interviews in my senior honors thesis. My questions varied by 
participant. When preparing for interviews with experts, I read their available publications online 
and tailored my questions to their particular expertise. Before interviewing government officials, 
I researched their levels of involvement with the development of the Moudawana. Finally, when 
speaking with Islamic feminists, I asked about the particular hermeneutical tools and methods of 
ijtihad they used in order to interpret the Sacred Texts.  
 
Part IV: Creation of the Moudawana 
The Royal Commission and King Mohammad VI created the Moudawana based on 
Islamic principles, the state’s obligations to international human rights conventions, and the 
realities of family life in contemporary Moroccan society. The regime utilized ijtihad in order to 
apply the fundamental principles of shari’a to the Moroccan context and address the challenges 
Morocco faces as a modern nation-state.  
Ijtihad is defined as “a process of reasoning and utmost effort to extract a rule from the 
subject matter of revelation while following the principles and procedures established in legal 
theory" (Yavuz, 2016, p. 207). Modern religious authorities have used ijtihad as a tool with 
which to increase the flexibility of Islamic law to respond to regional economic and socio-
political contexts. Under classical Islamic law, only a mujtahid has the authority to practice 
ijtihad. However, modern reformists propose that the idea of collective ijtihad can be used to 
combine the legal structures of the modern nation-state with classical Islamic legal institutions. 
This conception of ijtihad calls into question who has the right to interpret shari’a in the modern 
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political context. Reformers propose that the integration of ijtihad with the principles of Islamic 
legal consensus (ijma) and consultation (shura) could produce a collective ijtihad (ijtihad jama’i) 
that allows Islamic law to operate in harmony with the laws of the nation-state. Ijma refers to the 
principle of consensus and agreement amongst Islamic scholars, which reformers propose be 
transferred from the mujtahids to an Islamic legislative assembly. Meanwhile, shura means 
consultation, in reference to the fact that the Qur’an encourages Muslims to determine their laws 
in consultation with those who will be affected by those laws. The most prevalent approach to 
this collective ijtihad in recent years has been ijtihad that attempts to embody maqasid al-sharia, 
meaning the main objectives or spirit of shari’a. Many Muslim-majority nation-states have 
engaged in ijtihad in order to formulate their family laws. Miyase Yavuz identifies the 2004 
Moudawana reforms as “one of the latest remarkable modern exercises of ijtihad” (Yavuz, 2016, 
p. 208).  
Both the Islamists and the feminists drew upon the concept of ijtihad in their advocacy 
for and against reforms to the Moudawana. The PJD claimed that the National Plan for the 
Integration of Women and Development, which proposed reforms to the Moudawana, was 
antithetical to Islamic law, claiming that only the ulama had the right to exercise the ijtihad that 
such reforms would require. Meanwhile, women’s rights organizations claimed that every 
Muslim has the right to exercise ijtihad and encouraged ijtihad based on maqasid al-sharia. Some 
members of the ulama such as Ahmed el-Khamlichi, Mohammed el-Habti el-Mawahibi and Idris 
Hammadi also expressed support for the reforms (Yavuz 2016).   
 King Mohammed VI created the Royal Commission on April 17, 2001. He authorized the 
Commission to practice ijtihad in order to make “a substantial change to the Code of Personal 
Status which had to respect Islamic principles (maqasid al-shari’a) by also responding to the 
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exigencies of the time and to the worldwide application of some universal dispositions.” The 
King defined the scope of and limits for ijtihad by stating “I cannot allow what G-d has 
forbidden and forbid what G-d has authorized.” In this statement, King Mohammed VI 
articulates that ijtihad can only be exercised to interpret fiqh, which is Islamic jurisprudence or 
the human interpretation of shari’a based on the Qur’an and the Sunna. However, ijtihad cannot 
contradict what is explicitly stated in these texts.  
 I had the opportunity to speak with Nezha Chekrouni, who was one of the leading 
members of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces Party of Morocco (USFP) throughout the 
reform process. Ms. Chekrouni worked on the creation of the National Plan for the Integration of 
Women in Development and advocated for reforms to the Family Code leading up to both the 
1993 and 2004 reforms. After the USFP came to power in 1998, Ms. Chekrouni served as the 
Delegate-Minister for Women’s Conditions, Family and Children’s Protection. In this role, Ms. 
Chekrouni worked extensively with the regime to create the 2004 reforms. She described herself 
at the time as “the person who carried the project at the government level” (N. Chekrouni, 
personal communication, May 6, 2020). Ms. Chekrouni described King Mohammed VI’s 
decision to create a Royal Commission as “the right way to create a dialogue between all of the 
factions in society” so that “everybody could participate.” She explained that “when facing tough 
questions, the leadership of His Majesty is needed to keep the country unified and keep stability 
in the country. He is above all parties and complaints.”  
 The Royal Commission included three women: Zhor el-Horr, Nouzha Guessous, and 
Rahma Bourquia (Yavuz 2016). The King’s inclusion of women in the Royal Commission 
served as a symbolic step as he invited women into the traditionally male-dominated field of 
hermeneutics. The King appointed Supreme Court Justice President Driss Dahhak as chair of the 
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Commission. However, in March of 2002, the Commission presented a divided report to the 
King, who subsequently replaced Driss Dahhak with Muhammad Boucetta, the former foreign 
minister. 59 of the 60 proposals presented to the Royal Commission by experts and CSOs 
referenced a religious backing in Islamic jurisprudence. The Royal Commission based the 
Moudawana reforms on the Maliki school of jurisprudence and generally exercised collective 
ijtihad, based on the principles of justice and equality for all Muslims, regardless of gender. Zhor 
el-Horr, one of the three females on the Commission, described the principles of ijtihad used by 
the Commission in the creation of the Moudawana reforms:   
(a) the idea is that the door of ijtihād is open, (b) ijtihād al-jamā’iʻ is exercised through 
including different expertise within the commission, (c) the principles of ‘occasions of 
revelation’ (asbāb al-nuzūl) and the main objectives of the sacred texts (maqāṣid al-naṣṣ), 
that is justice, fairness, and the dignity of humans without gender differentiation, are 
considered, and (d) the goal is to ensure dignity (karāma), equality (musāwā) and fairness 
(inṣāf).  
Sadik Rddad, an expert in post-colonial studies and Assistant Professor of English at Sidi 
Mohamed Ben Abdellah University in Fez, explained to me that the methods of ijtihad employed 
in the formulation of the 2004 Family Code differed from those used in the creation of the 1957 
code as a result of the religious universities the scholars graduated from (S. Rddad, personal 
communication, May 12, 2020). He explained that the ten men who drafted the 1957 law all 
graduated from the University of al-Qarawiyyin, which concentrates on Islamic religious and 
legal sciences. This university is based on Maliki law and known for its conservativism. 
Meanwhile, members of the Royal Commission who drafted the 2004 law attended a variety of 
religious universities. Furthermore, the Commission included not only religious scholars but also 
“men and women from a diversity of profiles and fields,” including representatives of civil 
society and human rights activists. Professor Rddad articulated that the composure of this Royal 
Commission more accurately represented the interests of the whole of Moroccan society. He 
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proposed that this Commission was “more representative of the diversity of Moroccan society 
and, together, they conceived of an ijtihad based on the experiences of all these diverse groups.” 
Ms. Chekrouni, who presented before the Royal Commission as Delegate-Minister of Women’s 
Conditions, Family and Children’s Protection, also testified to the diversity of the presentations 
the Commission heard. She explained that “representatives from the Islamic field [and] from the 
law and psychology” fields presented before the Royal Commission in order to “question the 
situation from many dimensions” (N. Chekrouni, personal communication, May 6, 2020). 
Professor Rddad also asserted that the context in which these reforms unfolded shaped 
the direction of the ijtihad practiced. He proposed that “new democratic institutions, but also the 
international regime” created a “context that changed the ijtihad.” The preamble of the 
Moudawana articulates its “use of ijtihad to deduce laws and precepts, while taking into 
consideration the spirit of our modern era and the imperatives of development, in accordance 
with the Kingdom’s commitment to internationally recognized human rights” (translation). 
Professor Rddad articulated that the preamble demonstrates the Moudawana’s attempt to strike a 
balance between shari’a and Morocco’s international human rights commitments. Professor 
Rddad proposes that this international context led to the incorporation of ideas of universal 
human rights, women’s rights, and children’s rights. Ms. Chekrouni also asserted this idea in our 
conversation. She stated that Morocco “signed the CEDAW1; We are a part of the international 
community and we have commitments” (N. Chekrouni, personal communication, May 6, 2020). 
Ms. Chekrouni described the tension in creating the Moudawana reforms as centered around the 
 
1 The CEDAW is the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women. Morocco ratified the CEDAW in 1993, with reservations to articles 2, 9(2), 15(4), 16, 
and 29. This international treaty was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
December 1979. 
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question of “how do we conciliate between international commitments and values and, at the 
same time, respect our background as Moroccans, as Muslims” and “take into account all of the 
political trends in the society.”  
The Royal Commission reported its proposed changes to King Mohammed VI after thirty 
months of work. In his position as Commander of the Faithful, the King has the ultimate power 
to shape ijtihad and interpret Islamic law in the Moroccan context. When King Mohammed VI 
introduced the Moudawana to Parliament, he stated, 
[These reforms] adopt the tolerant principles of Islam in advocating human dignity, and 
enhancing justice, equality and good amicable social relations, and with the cohesiveness 
of the Malekite School as well as ijtihad, which makes Islam valid for any time and place, 
to implement a modern Moudawana for the family, consistent with the spirit of our 
glorious religion. 
In this statement, the King articulates the way maqasid al-shari’a as well as contemporary 
Moroccan realities shaped the ijtihad performed to create this law. He continued to explain that 
he “present[ed] the Family Code bill to the Parliament for the first time” so that Parliament could 
consider “its implications for civil law, noting that its religious legal provisions fall within the 
competence of the Commander of the Faithful” (translation). The King clearly articles that he 
alone has the authority to determine the religious legality of the reforms and that Parliament 
should solely focus on how to translate his proposed changes into workable policy reforms. The 
Justice, Legislative, and Human Rights Commissions of Parliament amended the Moudawana 
before it was eventually passed.  
The opening lines of the preamble of the Moudawana state that “doing justice to women, 
protecting children’s rights and preserving men’s dignity are a fundamental part of this project, 
which adheres to Islam’s tolerant ends and objectives, notably justice, equality, solidarity, 
ijtihad…” (translation). Professor Rddad explained that the Moudawana’s attempt to embody 
“Islam’s tolerant ends and objectives” represents a form of ijtihad that strives to realize maqasid 
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al-shari’a by bringing “divine justice” to all people. Professor Rddad explained that this 
“enlightened, open ijtihad” allowed for the production of the 2004 Moudawana reforms.  
 The 2004 Moudawana included several major changes to marriage, divorce, and child 
custody laws. The ijtihad utilized in these reforms was grounded in two primary approaches to 
jurisprudence: 1) selection of jurisprudential opinions from minority views within the Maliki 
school from previous jurists and from other schools of Islamic jurisprudence and 2) a holistic 
interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunna based on maqasid al-shari’a. The ijtihad employed in 
the creation of the Moudawana attempts to create a law grounded in the Islamic legal tradition 
that also reflects the contemporary realities of Moroccan society and adheres to international 
standards. For the remainder of this section I will examine the major changes made to the 2004 
Moudawana and articulate the justifications for such reforms in Islamic law when applicable.  
 In the field of marital law, the Moudawana reforms changed the legal age of marriage to 
18 for both males and females, whereas the previous code stipulated that while a boy could be 
married at 18, a girl could be married at 15. However, Article 20 of the 2004 Moudawana states 
that “The Family Affairs Judge in charge of marriage may authorize the marriage of a girl or boy 
below the legal age of marriage… after having heard the parents of the minor who has not yet 
reached the age of capacity of his/her legal tutor, with the assistance of medical expertise or after 
having conducted a social enquiry” (cite translation). Therefore, a judge still has the power to 
authorize the marriage of a minor. The 2004 Moudawana also removes the requirement that a 
woman have the permission of a wali or marital tutor to enter into a marriage contract (cite 
translation). Article 24 of the Moudawana states that “marital tutelage is the woman’s right, 
which she exercises upon reaching majority according to her choice and interests.” This change 
in the Moudawana draws upon the legal opinion of the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence, 
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which does not oblige women to have a wali. Despite the fact that Moroccan Islam and the 
Moudawana are generally based on the Maliki school, which requires marital guardianship for 
women, the 2004 Moudawana reforms base their decision on the Hanafi School’s legal opinion 
on this matter (Yavuz 2016). The removal of the requirement of a wali demonstrates the ways in 
which the 2004 Moudawana draws on the rulings of other schools in order to adjust to 
contemporary realities. The new Code also awards both the wife and husband joint responsibility 
over family matters (translation). While the previous code drew upon the principle of qiwama2 to 
grant husbands sole authority in family matters and require that a wife obey her husband, the 
new Code grants both spouses equal responsibility based on verses throughout the Qur’an that 
reference equality and consultation (Yavuz 2016). The 2004 Moudawana also instituted changes 
to the marital contract. Although Islamic law has always allowed couples to draft marital 
contracts, the Moudawana reforms allow couples to agree in advance how marital assets will be 
divided in case of divorce. A woman may also stipulate in her marital contract that her husband 
may not take a second wife. Although Morocco’s new Family Code has not utilized ijtihad to 
outright ban polygamy as Tunisia has, the new reforms do seek to limit the already rare 
occurrence of polygamy in Moroccan society. Women’s rights organizations advocated for a ban 
on all polygamy, but they were unable to win this fight because the Qur’an explicitly addresses 
polygamy. Therefore, based on the King’s stipulation that he could not “forbid what G-d has 
authorized,” the Moudawana does not ban polygamy. However, the 2004 reforms do require a 
husband to both inform and receive consent from his first wife in order to marry an additional 
woman (Zoglin 2009). A man seeking to marry an additional wife must also receive judicial 
 
2 The principle of male authority over women based on historical interpretations of verse 4:34 of 
the Qur’an  
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approval. According to Article 41 of the Moudawana, the court will not authorize polygamy if 
“an exceptional and objective justification is not proven” (cite translation). Islamic law has also 
historically required a husband to devote equal time, attention, and resources to all of his wives. 
The Moudawana retains this feature of classical Islamic law in Article 40 which articulates that 
“[p]olygamy is forbidden when there is a risk of inequity between the wives.” The Moudawana 
requires family judges to ensure that the husband has the financial means to provide for all of his 
wives. Under the 2004 reforms, a judge is also required to confirm that the second wife is aware 
of the first wife before the judge finalizes the marriage. Professor Rddad explained to me that, in 
this law, the King “tries to translate the idea that polygamy is allowed but not encouraged and 
only allowed if [the husband] can be just and fair to all [of his wives]” (S. Rddad, personal 
communication, May 12, 2020). Professor Rddad argues that through these reforms the King 
adopts a “reading [of] the Qur’an from a perspective which is more enlightened” and attempts 
“to make polygamy almost impossible.” 
 The 2004 Moudawana institutes significant reforms in the sphere of divorce law. Under 
the previous Family Code, only husbands had the right to divorce their wives, and wives had no 
access to divorce. Furthermore, the previous code allowed a husband to divorce his wife orally 
and without judicial approval. Under the 2004 Moudawana, women have secured the right to 
initiate divorce proceedings. Both men and women are required to obtain judicial authorization 
in order to divorce their spouse. The reforms also introduce new grounds for divorce, including 
right to divorce “by mutual consent under judicial supervision” and divorce based on 
“irreconcilable differences.” The Moudawana now also requires courts to issue decisions on 
divorce cases within six months of the petitioner filing the request. Additionally, judges may not 
grant a divorce until the couples have attended mediation or reconciliation sessions. The 
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Moudawana requires reconciliation sessions in order to deter divorce based on the Hadith by the 
Prophet Mohammed stating that ‘The most hateful to G-d among all lawful things is divorce’ 
(cite translation). The Moudawana also increases the role of judges in determining how assets are 
divided when a couple divorces, based on the judge’s assessment of the relative contribution of 
each spouse to the household capital during the marriage (Zoglin 2009).  
 The 2004 Moudawana also introduces the concept of the best interests of the child to 
Moroccan family law and expands the rights of both women and children in paternity disputes. 
Under the previous Family Code, a mother automatically lost custody of her children if she 
moved or re-married (Zoglin 2009). However, although a mother may still lose her children for 
these reasons, the Moudawana now requires judges to make such decisions with the best interests 
of the child in mind. While judges were not previously involved in resolving child custody 
issues, the Moudawana now instructs judges to assess a potential guardian’s ability to create a 
positive living environment for the child. Under the Moudawana, the man remains the 
presumptive legal guardian of his children, regardless of which parent has custody of the 
children, unless otherwise stipulated by a judge. The Moudawana also, for the first time, 
introduces a mechanism to determine the paternity of a child born out of wedlock. Children born 
out of wedlock now automatically receive legal recognition and courts have the ability to use 
scientific testing to resolve disputes over paternity. Professor Rddad explained that the ijtihad 
utilized in this section of the law “protects children’s rights by incorporating international human 
rights conventions” (S. Rddad, personal communication, May 12, 2020). Morocco ratified the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child in June of 1993 (UN). These changes to custody and 
paternity laws demonstrate the ways in which the King and the Royal Commission utilized 
ijtihad to create a family law that embodies both universal human rights and the principles of 
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justice outline in the Qur’an. Professor Rddad argues that this newfound effort to protect the 
rights of children results from an understanding of ijtihad within the maqasid al-shari’a, 
embodying the Qur’anic aim of “ending injustice to any human being.”  
 While the King instituted significant reforms in the fields of marriage, divorce, and child 
custody, to the disappointment of many women’s rights organizations, he made few changes to 
inheritance laws. The Qur’an directly states that a girl will receive half of what her male 
counterpart receives in inheritance. As the Qur’an directly and specifically articulates this 
provision, the King stated that he could not change this law. However, the 2004 reforms did 
include one change to previous inheritance laws in obligatory bequests. The 2004 Moudawana 
required grandchildren on the daughter’s side of the family to receive an obligatory amount from 
the grandparent’s estate, whereas, under the previous code, only the grandchildren on the son’s 
side could receive inheritance (Yavuz). This aspect of the previous code was “based on obsolete 
tribal custom,” also known as urf and “not on any religious or legal grounds” (Hursh). Urf is an 
Islamic legal practice that permits the continued observance of local customs provided that those 
customs do not contradict shari’a. The decision to reform this law indicates a change in the 
Moroccan government’s interpretation of Islamic law. The Islamic jurisprudence that went into 
the formulation of this law previously held that this local custom did not contradict shari’a. 
However, the fact that the Moudawana eliminated the observance of this urf indicates that the 
Moroccan government now views this practice as incompatible with shari’a.  
 The 2004 Moudawana also utilizes more imprecise and ambiguous language than 
previous codes, which allocates significantly more discretion to judges in deciding family court 
cases. The following section will discuss the implications of this vague language for the 
implementation of this law.  
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Part V: Implementation 
The judiciary system has successfully implemented the provisions of the Moudawana in 
the spheres of marriage and grounds for divorce (Zoglin 2009). Courts have upheld laws 
requiring husbands to financially support their wives and approved a significant quantity of 
divorces based on the new grounds for divorce introduced by the Moudawana such as divorce 
due to irreconcilable differences. However, my interviews with various experts in the field 
highlighted three fundamental barriers to adequate implementation of the 2004 Moudawana: 1) 
women’s persistent and widespread lack of awareness of their rights under the new reforms 2) 
the vague wording of the law which transferred significant discretionary power to judges and 3) 
women’s lack of economic independence. These barriers have resulted in faulty application of 
the Moudawana in numerous fields within family law including underage marriages, domestic 
violence, and distribution of family assets. The findings of my interviews are generally 
consistent with the reports of numerous non-governmental organizations in Morocco. The Non-
Governmental Organisations’ UN Shadow Report concerning the Moroccan government’s 
implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW)3 highlights the following issues with the implementation of the Moudawana:  
The Family Code which maintains polygamy, discrimination in inheritance and the legal 
guardianship of children as well as repudiation. As for the implementation of the new 
legislation, shortcomings are patent. These include the propensity of judges to 
systematically authorise the marriage of female minors and polygamy (though related 
legal provisions are subject to very restrictive conditions); difficulties facing women in 
all divorce proceedings (including new legal procedures that are supposed to 
facilitate women’s access to divorce, particularly on grounds of marital discord and by 
mutual agreement); difficulty in the application of the right of divorced female custodians 
to stay in the matrimonial home, and the limited nature of provisions related to paternity 
acknowledgement.  
 
3 Hereafter this report will be referenced as ‘NGO Shadow Report’ 
 26 
In the following section, I will first cover the three crucial barriers to implementation of 
the Moudawana, followed by an assessment of how these barriers contribute to discrimination 
and violence against women in Moroccan family law.  
Moroccan women, particularly in rural areas, are generally unaware of the new rights 
afforded to them by the 2004 reforms (Zoglin 2009). Many rural women do not know that they 
have the right to divorce, that there are new grounds for divorce, or how property is divided in 
the event of divorce. This lack of widespread information is primarily the result of female 
illiteracy and inadequate educational campaigns in rural areas on the part of the Moroccan 
government (CSO). According to the World Bank, Morocco’s adult4 female literacy rate is 
64.59% as of 2018 (World Bank). Meanwhile, the illiteracy rate of rural Moroccan women 
stands at 85% (Hursh 2012). This illiteracy combined with widespread poverty prevents women 
from exercising their rights under the law. 
The second barrier to adequate implementation of the Moudawana that I identified in my 
research stems from the vague wording of the law that has resulted in increased judiciary 
discretion. As a result of political compromise, the drafters of the Moudawana left much of the 
code’s wording intentionally vague. Ms. Chekrouni explained that in order “to make the change, 
we had to… leave it to the judge’s discretion” (N. Chekrouni, personal communication, May 6, 
2020). Manal Dao-Sabah, a Ph.D. candidate writing her dissertation on Islamism in Morocco, 
criticizes “the state for producing ambiguous and inconsistent laws” (M. Dao-Sabah, personal 
communication, May 6 2020). She explained to me that these inconsistencies have resulted in 
numerous problems at the level of implementation.  The lack of clarity in the law’s language 
leaves excessive room for judges to interpret the law according to their own beliefs and 
 
4 defined as aged 15 and above 
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understandings of Islamic law. The increased judiciary discretion afforded by this law has 
resulted in an application of the Moudawana that is inconsistent with the drafter’s intent. The last 
article of the Moudawana provides judges with guidelines on how to interpret the law for 
situations the law does not address or situations in which the law is unclear (Zoglin 2009). This 
section advises judges to refer to the Maliki school of jurisprudence and to the Islamic principles 
of justice and equality. Through judicial discretion, hermeneutics and individual interpretations 
of Islamic law by judges plays a role in how the Moudawana is implemented on the ground. In 
situations where the language of the Moudawana is ambiguous, conservative judges tend to rule 
in a manner far more restrictive of women’s rights than progressive judges do. Both conservative 
and progressive judges cite various interpretations of Islamic law to back their rulings. 
Additionally, in situations where the Moudawana clearly and explicitly addresses a situation, 
some judges may still base their decisions on different interpretations of Islamic law.5 Manal 
Dao-Sabah asserts that conservative application of the law stems from the fact that judges 
continue to “receive traditional training” and the fact that the “judiciary system is still a 
patriarchal space” (M. Dao-Sabah, personal communication, May 6 2020). Additionally, Manal 
Dao-Sabah proposes that textual inconsistencies between the 2011 Constitution and the 
Moudawana makes the intentions of the Moudawana unclear. Article 196 of the Moroccan 
 
5 For example, one court in Larache, a town in northern Morocco, continues to exclusively apply 
the 1957 Personal Status Code.  
6 Article 19: The man and the woman enjoy, in equality, the rights and freedoms of civil, 
political, economic, social, cultural and environmental character, enounced in this Title and 
in the other provisions of the Constitution, as well as in the international conventions and 
pacts duly ratified by Morocco and this, with respect for the provisions of the Constitution, of 
the constants [constantes] and of the laws of the Kingdom. 
 
The State works for the realization of parity between men and women. 
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Constitution establishes legal equality between the sexes. However, Manal Dao-Sabah argues 
that inheritance law, which discriminates on the basis of gender, stands in direct contrast to 
Article 19’s statement of legal equality between the sexes. She proposes that “to realize gender 
equality in Morocco both men and women need to be financially independent” and that 
“inheritance law is an economic violence against women.” Manal Dao-Sabah argues that this 
textual contradiction also contributes to inconsistent application of the law by judges as the law’s 
intent is unclear. The aforementioned NGO Shadow Report recommends that the Moroccan 
government “limit the discretionary power of judges within the Code,” citing this power as one 
of the primary barriers to Morocco’s full adherence to CEDAW.  
 Women’s financial dependence on their husbands also poses a significant barrier to 
adequate implementation of the Moudawana. To discuss this issue, I interviewed Dr. Souad 
Eddouada, an expert on the Moroccan women’s rights movement, who is widely published in her 
field. She explained that, despite new provisions in the Moudawana designed to provide women 
with increased agency and legal rights, women often do not exercise these rights as they are 
economically dependent on their husbands (S. Eddouada, personal communication, April 30, 
2020). Dr. Eddouada proposes that the Moudawana “is an advanced law but we need the 
socioeconomic support for equality.” Women’s lack of economic independence often forces 
them to remain in polygamous or domestically abusive marriages. Dr. Eddouada told me that her 
friend who serves as a judge in a family court in Rabat is often forced to accept applications for 
polygamous marriages because the first wife begs the judge to accept because her husband has 
threatened to divorce her if she does not accept. These women will explain that if their husband 
 




divorces them, they will lose all socioeconomic support. Dr. Eddouada explained that “despite 
the fact that the law constrains polygamy… the exception is becoming the rule,” as a result of 
both women’s economic dependence and judicial discretion. Manal Dao-Sabah articulated that 
“the judge has the freedom to decide on matters of polygamous marriages… based on their own 
convictions.” Therefore, many judges are approving nearly all polygamy cases presented to 
them, despite the fact that the law requires proof of “an exceptional and objective” justification.  
This lack of financial independence forces women to agree not only to polygamous 
marriages but also to remain in abusive marriages. Women without the means to support 
themselves fear that a divorce will leave them destitute. Additionally, Dr. Eddouada informed me 
that “judges are not implementing the Code correctly” in cases of domestic abuse. Ms. 
Chekrouni also discussed the issue of faulty application of the Moudawana in the sphere of 
gender-based violence. She explained that “when a beaten woman goes to the police to report 
this, they consider this as a family problem or matter even though the Moudawana says that a 
man can be imprisoned for beating his wife, but culturally they consider this to be a family 
problem” (N. Chekrouni, personal communication, May 6, 2020). The 2015 Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices in Morocco published by the U.S. Department of State articulated that, 
despite provisions within the Moudawana designed to prevent domestic abuse, violence against 
women has increased in recent years. The report states that in 20097, 63% of women reported 
suffering an act of violence in the preceding year. Women’s rights advocacy groups estimate that 
“that husbands perpetrated eight of 10 cases of violence against women.” 
 Dr. Eddouada, Manal Dao-Sabah, and Ms. Chekrouni all highlighted the fact that 
Moudawana provisions intended to limit child marriages have largely failed.  In 2006, judges 
 
7 No survey has been conducted on this subject since 2009. 
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approved 89% of underage marriage applications, 97.5% of which involved the marriage of an 
underage girl (Shadow Report). Dr. Eddouada and Manal Dao-Sabah both cited judicial 
discretion as the primary cause of this phenomenon as judges continue to approve nearly all 
applications for marriages of underage girls, regardless of the justification given, based on their 
own beliefs about Islamic law. Ms. Chekrouni stated that underage marriage “is something that 
unfortunately continues to be a problem in our society because the legislature opened a window 
to make some exceptions and once you have exceptions you can no longer control the 
exceptions” (N. Chekrouni, personal communication, May 6, 2020). This description outlines the 
way in which any legal loopholes, particularly those couched in vague language, can be 
exploited by the judiciary to undermine the Moudawana reforms. For this reason, the NGO 
Shadow Report recommends that Morocco institute further reforms to the Moudawana that 
would prohibit polygamy and child marriage entirely.8 
 After learning that women’s lack of financial independence poses a major barrier to the 
implementation of the Moudawana, I attempted to investigate aspects of the Moudawana that 
address the division of economic assets. My participants often brought up these issues 
unprompted when asked about persisting problems with the Moudawana. The two major areas of 
the family law that came up were inheritance law and the division of family assets after divorce. 
Inheritance is an extremely controversial issue in Moroccan society. Although participants did 
 
8 To evidence the psychological and physical risks posed by underage marriage, the NGO 
Shadow Report provides an example of such a case, reported by Pour les Droits des Femmes 
(IPDF): “The plaintiff was married at the age of 16 years. She was exposed since the first day of 
her marriage to moral violence by the family of her husband who ended up taking her back to her 
mother after six months of marriage. Currently, the victim is under medical surveillance. She 
suffers from psychological disorder which led to loss of voice as a result of violence.” 
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not bring up issues with the implementation of inheritance laws, they did raise issues with the 
law itself. I will address efforts to reform inheritance law in the following section.  
 As with many other areas of the Moudawana, judges have enormous discretionary power 
to determine the apportionment of property acquired during marriage in the event of divorce 
(Shadow Report). Article 49 of the Moudawana establishes that “each of the spouses has an 
estate separate from the other. However, the two spouses may, under the framework of the 
management of assets to be acquired during the marriage, agree on their investment and 
distribution” (translation). However, couples rarely formulate such a contract due to social 
pressure and cultural norms (Shadow Report). Article 49 continues to state that “in the absence 
of such an agreement, recourse is made to general standards of evidence, while taking into 
consideration the work of each spouse, the efforts made as well as the responsibilities assumed in 
the development of family assets” (translation). This article provides judges with the power to 
decide what assets each partner will retain based on their assessment of the relative contributions 
of each to the acquisition of such property. When making such assessments, judges rarely place 
any capital value on women’s contributions of domestic labor and childcare. Therefore, women 
frequently receive a minute portion of marital assets in divorce proceedings. Ms. Chekrouni 
articulated her belief that this flaw in the implementation of the Moudawana stems from the 
vague terms of the article.  
 Despite the widespread availability of data evidencing faulty implementation of the 
Moudawana throughout Morocco, the government has taken few steps to address these issues. 
Even without conducting a serious rewrite of the entire code to make it more precise, the state 
could take several other steps to improve implementation, such as a judge training program or 
enforcement mechanisms to ensure that all courts adhere to the correct version of the code. 
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Several political analysts and experts, including Dr. Eddouada propose that King Mohammed VI 
created the Moudawana with the intent of projecting the image of Morocco as a liberal state, 
rather than in hopes of authentically increasing gender equality. These experts cite the state’s 
negligence of these implementation issues as proof that the 2004 Moudawana reforms were 
essentially a performance. Dr. Eddouada argues that the State attempts to disseminate the idea 
that Moroccan Islam is fundamentally different from the practice of Islam in other Muslim-
majority nations. The government contends that this unique version of Moroccan Islam is 
compatible with liberal Western-style democracy. Dr. Eddouada argues that “this is more of a 
performance than a reality” as the state “perceives itself as a liberal Muslim country that is open 
to women’s rights” despite the fact that Moroccan citizens do not agree with this description. Dr. 
Eddouada explained that most Moroccans perceive the Moudawana as “a Westernized law 
imported from Christianity and created to destroy the culture and destroy the family unit.” She 
believes that “in general, the people are much more conservative than what the state wants them 
to be.”  
 In an effort to spread the state’s vision of Moroccan Islamic exceptionalism throughout 
the nation, the state created the Mohammedan League of Religious Scholars (al-Rabita 
Muhammadia of Ulema). This organization promotes a progressive vision of maqasid al-shari’a 
in order to promote women’s rights and combat extremism in the aftermath of the 2003 
Casablanca attacks (Pektas 2019). After these terrorist attacks, the state embarked on a campaign 
to control religious practice and scholarship in Morocco. Alongside the creation of The 
Mohammedan League of Religious Scholars, King Mohammed VI developed more extensive 
religious institutions throughout the nation and bureaucratized existing institutions. The 
Mohammedan League or Religious Scholars serves as the intellectual head of the Moroccan 
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religious bureaucracy by providing scholarly support for the state’s vision of Moroccan Islam. 
Dr. Eddouada described this organization as “part of a state project to add to the image [the state] 
want[s] to send to the world that Morocco is a country of liberal Islam and women’s and human 
rights” (S. Eddouada, personal communication, April 30, 2020). In 2006, King Mohammed VI 
also created the murshidat program. Murshidat are women being trained by the state to serve as 
religious guides throughout Morocco, as part of the government’s campaign to carve out a space 
for female religious authority in Islam (El-Haitami). Through these institutions, the state attempts 
to shape Moroccan religious and spiritual practice to conform to the state’s vision of a tolerant 
and progressive Moroccan Islam. Dr. Eddouada described the Murshidat program “the 
reconstruction of the religious sphere.” Although the state has received significant criticism for 
its unwillingness to enforce the Moudawana, I suggest that these programs attempt to shift 
Moroccan religious belief such that it aligns with the progressive conception of religion 
embodied in the Moudawana. Such a shift in the nation’s beliefs may lay the foundation for 
adequate implementation of the existing code and for the execution of further progressive 
reforms to the Moudawana in the future.  
 However, these programs also represent the regime’s attempt to control religion. Dr. 
Eddouada argues through these programs “religion became a tool for authoritarianism” (S. 
Eddouada, personal communication, April 30, 2020). Research on the murshidat indicates that 
the state provides these female spiritual guides with precise and strict instructions on the 
guidance they give. Dr. Eddouada also explained to me that the “Imams are controlled by the 
state” and “every issue is decided by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs.”  
 I believe that this contradiction represents the fundamental tension of the women’s rights 
movement in Morocco. Both the state’s creation of the Moudawana and its bureaucratization of 
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religion have been executed through top-down unilateral reforms. While governments and 
analysts around the world praise the 2004 Moudawana for its liberal promotion of women’s 
rights, these actors often ignore the fact that this progress was achieved through undemocratic 
means. Liberalism values the consent of the governed, individual rights, and equality before the 
law. However, the Moroccan regime has attempted to achieve equality before the law at the 
expense of both the consent of the governed and individual rights. Individual rights include 
freedom of religion, which I argue the state prevents by imposing its vision of ‘correct’ religious 
practice, a vision formulated by the regime, on its people. While I champion the increases in 
women’s rights under the 2004 Moudawana, I propose that the emerging Islamic feminist 
movement in Morocco has the potential to lead to additional reforms in Moroccan family law, 
grounded in the feminist hermeneutics of qualified individuals who are independent of the state. 
The feminist hermeneutics practiced by Islamic feminists would provide religious justification 
for closing loopholes in the provisions of the current family code and instituting further reforms 
to increase women’s legal rights. In the final section of this study, I will present the findings of 
my research on Islamic feminism and analyze the strengths and limitations of this movement.  
 
Part VI: Islamic Feminism as the Way Forward 
Despite the fact that the Moroccan state has attempted to “co-opt the language of Islamic 
feminism,” as Dr. Eddouada described it, Islamic feminists have begun to form an independent, 
transnational movement (S. Eddouada, personal communication, April 30, 2020). Islamic 
feminism is a movement of female theologians attempting to re-read the Sacred Texts through a 
feminist lens. These women believe that while the Qur’an remains the sacred and divine word of 
G-d, Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh is a human production and thus subject to change (Rddad 
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2018). Female theologians attempt to determine how the Qur’an itself dictates gender relations, 
rather than how scholars have historically interpreted it. Through ijtihad these women attempt to 
place religious scholarship in the sociopolitical and historical context in which it was created. In 
our interview, Manal Dao-Sabah articulated that “certain religious texts are taken out of their 
context and out of their history” and that Islamic feminists use “linguistic tools to create feminist 
hermeneutics.” Manal Dao-Sabah explained that these linguistic tools allow Islamic feminists to 
identify unclear passages of the Qur’an from which two readings can be drawn and then they can 
ask “why do you focus on the patriarchal reading of this instead of the egalitarian one?” Islamic 
feminists argue that contemporary Muslim societies use shari’a as “a sacred justification for any 
discrimination or inequality.” These women propose that, contrary to Western interpretations, 
Islam does not create gender discrimination but rather that powerful males within Muslim 
societies manipulate Islam to support patriarchy. Islamic feminists propose that male theologians 
have created a hermeneutical tradition that ignores maqasid al-shari’a, which champions social 
justice and equality. In his paper concerning Islamic feminists whom he names as “Muslima 
theologians,” Professor Rddad articulates that Western colonialism led to the rise of increasingly 
conservative Islamic legal scholarship as the Muslim world rallied around sacred institutions as a 
form of anti-colonial resistance. Therefore, in the aftermath of the colonial era, the concept of 
feminism and gender equality came to be associated with the imposition of Western values. 
Professor Rddad explains that this oppositional framework suggests that the only options for 
gender relations are the Islamic conservativism and Western secular feminism. Islamic feminists 
simultaneously reject Western secular feminism and combat patriarchy based on conservative, 
traditional interpretations of Islam. Commonly referred to as “third way feminism,” Islamic 
feminists attempt to carve out a form of female empowerment grounded in the sacred texts of 
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Islam. Islamic feminism differs from Western conceptions of feminism because, rather than 
separating gender relations from religion, Islamic feminism redefines gender relations through 
religion itself. In our interview, Professor Rddad explained that, in Islam, gender relations are 
triangular as the “relationship between man and woman is negotiated through the Sacred Text.” 
Professor Rddad proposes that these women are “not trying to deconstruct Islam but rather to 
radically reconstruct the tradition from within.”  
Building upon the foundational work of Fatima Mernissi, contemporary female 
theologians including Asma Barlas, Asma Lamrabet, and amina wadud9 employ a variety of 
hermeneutical tools to reinterpret the sacred texts of Islam. Fatima Mernissi, Asma Barlas, and 
amina wadud challenge patriarchal norms through feminist readings of the Qur’an. In her book 
Believing Women in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur’an, Asma Barlas 
articulates that "the conservatism of Muslim tradition, method, and memory" results from "a 
specific configuration of political and sexual power that privileged the state over civil society, 
men over women, conservatism over egalitarianism, and some religious texts and methodologies 
over others.” Barlas asserts that the Qur’an promotes equality but “since the Qur’an was revealed 
into an existing patriarchy and has been interpreted by adherents of patriarchies ever since, 
Muslim women have a stake in challenging its patriarchal exegesis” (AB book). Meanwhile, 
Asma Lamrabet, the foremost figure in the Moroccan Islamic feminist movement, rereads both 
the Qur’an and hadith, with a particular focus on al-Bukhari’s Sahih (Rddad 2018). Lamrabet 
advocates for a number of reforms to the Moudawana, including in the sphere of inheritance law. 
In particular, Lamrabet deconstructs the Qur’anic concept of “quiwama” based on both textual 
 
9 Dr. wadud informed me over email correspondence that she does not capitalize the letters in her 
name  
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interpretations and the socio-economic realities of modern Moroccan society in order to advocate 
for a more egalitarian conception of marriage under the law. She also maintains that female 
coverings should not be obligatory and that states’ imposition of the hijab violates the Qur’anic 
principle of “no compulsion in religion.” 
In order to gain more insight into the figures within the Islamic feminist movement, I 
interviewed amina wadud, one of the founders of Islamic feminism, about her methods of 
hermeneutical interpretation and her motivations for producing such work. When I asked her 
how she came to pursue this path she expressed that she had felt a “firsthand experience of the 
Qur’an as a guiding light and the disconnect between that experience and what [she] began to 
witness in terms of the lived realities of Muslim women” (a. wadud, personal communication, 
May 11 2020). When she moved to Malaysia, Dr. wadud encountered other Muslim women who 
expressed similar feelings of disconnect between a religious identity that they loved and their 
treatment within this identity group. Dr. wadud explained that through her encounter with these 
women she came to realize that the disconnect resulted from “an intervention between the sacred 
trajectory of the Qur’an and the establishment of that trajectory in history, communities, and the 
law.” Dr. wadud came to realize that the patriarchal elements of Islam had been constructed 
through human rather than divine production of the law and sought identify the core messages of 
Islam through textual analysis. She informed me that methodology is critical for her work 
because “if we’re all reading the same texts why are we not all coming to the conclusion?” Dr. 
wadud grounds her ijtihad in textual analysis. “I stuck with strict textual analysis because there 
was so much evidence to support the location of a distinction” between the divine law and the 
human interpretation of it. Dr. wadud also emphasizes the role that lived experience plays in 
hermeneutics. She explained that “when you have only men that are participating in it, that 
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means that men’s ways of experiencing intimacy with the law are taken into consideration but 
women are only going to be taken into consideration as much as the men want to bring them in.” 
Through this emphasis on “exegesis on the basis of lived realities,” Dr. wadud highlights the 
significance of the fact that Muslim women have entered the historically male-dominated field of 
hermeneutics. Therefore, Islamic feminism produces a new form of Islamic scholarship not only 
because its members attempt to reread the texts with a feminist lens but also because these 
women’s experiences and lived realities will be translated into their readings.  
Dr. wadud added that her work also includes “unpacking the unnecessary opposition of 
binaries.” She explained that when feminism and Islam are presented in juxtaposition, she works 
to “achieve the equality and reciprocity of those two as opposed to making them into a 
hegemonic binary or opposition.” In response to this statement, I asked her about the argument 
that universal human rights are inherently incompatible with Islam because while Western 
societies value individual rights, Muslim societies value collective rights. She immediately stated 
that this argument, which she identified as Muslim exceptionalism, “is used as a blinder to ignore 
issues that apply to people individually.” Dr. wadud argues that “the idea that the West has 
perfected individuality and Muslims have perfected community” is false and that “this becomes 
an excuse not to engage.” Through this assertion, Dr. wadud combats one of the most widespread 
arguments against reforms aimed at increasing women’s rights in the Muslim world. She 
articulates that, although Muslim societies may value the community more than some Western 
ones do, “even in Islam, we have a notion of what it means to be human.” However, she 
articulates that “there has never been a universal definition of who gets to be human.” She 
argued that just as “black lives are not given the same value in American society,” “the notion of 
human was not fairly distributed to all humans” in the historical practice of Islam, which at times 
 39 
incorporated persistent societal structures from pre-Islamic Arabia such as slavery and gender 
inequality. Therefore, she proposes that “today we need to revisit the sources of the construction 
of what it means to be human in Islam and then we can get to the word rights.” Through their 
readings of the sacred texts, Dr. wadud and other Islamic feminists demonstrate the fact that 
Islam does include women in its definition of humanity. Islamic feminists advocate for equality 
in the law based on this definition of humanity.  
 Although Dr. wadud work focuses primarily Indonesia and Malaysia, she is part of a 
transnational Islamic feminist organization known as Musawah, the Arabic word for equality. 
This organization defines its work as “a global movement for equality and justice in the Muslim 
family” (Musawah website) Several of the experts I spoke to throughout my interviews identified 
Musawah as the most organized structures within the Islamic feminist movement. Musawah’s 
website describes their mission “to build and share knowledge that supports equality and justice 
in the Muslim family using a holistic approach that combines Islamic principles and 
jurisprudence, international human rights standards, national laws and constitutional guarantees 
of equality and non-discrimination and the lived realities of women and men.” As Musawah’s 
work as well as that of Dr. wadud focuses on Muslim family law, I spoke to Dr. wadud about the 
Moroccan Family Code. She explained that the methodologies used to re-interpret these texts can 
be applied to the family codes of many Muslim-majority countries. She acknowledged that, 
although the specific regional context influences the possibilities for reform, Islamic feminists 
can draw upon the Islamic sources and methodologies used by their counterparts in one country 
and apply it to another. For example, she proposes that the ijtihad exercised by Tunisian scholars 
to justify the country’s absolute ban on polygamy could be applied to other countries’ family 
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laws as well. However, Dr. wadud concedes that such reforms must come from within Morocco 
itself. 
 Musawah provides a platform on which advocates for family law reform in Muslim-
majority countries can exchange these methodologies of scriptural interpretation. I attended a 
webinar hosted by Musawah during Ramadan in which three Islamic feminists came together to 
describe their work and answer questions about the movement. The panelists included Asma 
Lamrabet, Omaima Abou-Bakr, and Mulki Al-Sharmani. Mulki Al-Sharmani, an author and 
expert on reform of Muslim family law in Egypt, articulated that Musawah’s mission is to 
“deconstruct patriarchal interpretations and reconstructing interpretation based on an egalitarian 
vision from within, based on the text” (webinar). All three panelists explained how their work 
involves rereading both passages of the Qur’an commonly used to discriminate against women 
due to patriarchal interpretations and what they described as the “forgotten verses” of the Qur’an. 
They argue that the male hermeneutic tradition ignored more egalitarian passages of the Qur’an 
that could not be used to reinforce patriarchal norms. Omaima, a board member of the 
International Advisory Group of Musawah, explained that “patriarchal assumptions of the ages 
governed the interpretations, governed the discourse, and was allowed to take over.” She asserts 
that Islam must move “beyond the historical cultural construction of these verses where some 
verses have been ignored.” Asma Lamrabet explained that “knowledge is power everywhere, 
especially in religion” and that “men for centuries had this sacred power, which is also political 
power.” She explained that the “patriarchal system used this power,” drawn from knowledge of 
the sacred texts, to oppress women.  
 I will now assess the strengths and limitations of this movement’s ability to marshal 
reforms to the Moroccan Family Code in the future. My interviews with members of and experts 
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on the Islamic feminist movement revealed the ways in which transnational Islamic feminism 
can provide a religious basis for reforms to the Moudawana that would increase women’s rights. 
Dr. wadud explained how the ijtihad employed in the formation of Tunisia’s polygamy ban could 
be applied to close the loopholes in the Moudawana that allow judges to approve nearly all 
polygamy cases. I propose that the practice and spread of feminist hermeneutics could allow the 
Moroccan government to reform the Moudawana to expand women’s rights through Islam. 
However, through this research I also sought to determine whether or not Islamic feminism could 
address the economic dependency that forces women to surrender their rights under the existing 
legislation. I posed this question to Dr. Raja Rhouni, an expert in Moroccan Islamic feminism, 
whose scholarship focuses primarily on the work of Fatima Mernissi. Dr. Rhouni responded that 
she did not believe that feminist hermeneutics could address the issue of gendered economic 
inequality because this places the “burden of women’s economic empowerment” on Islam, 
because Islam is not the source of women’s financial dependency (R. Rhuoni, personal 
communication, May 2, 2020) . She articulated that “as long as the diagnosis [of the problem] is 
Islam then you assume that the solution should come from [Islam], when actually the problem is 
the entire economic system.” The scholarship of other authors such as John Hursh supports Dr. 
Rhouni’s assertion that women’s financial dependency in Morocco does not stem solely from 
Islamic law. Hursh argues that the root cause of female oppression in Islamic states is the 
poverty caused by “globalization, structural adjustment programs and uneven modernization” 
(Hursh 2012). Ms. Chekrouni also identified unequal access to education between men and 
women as the primary barrier to Moroccan women’s economic empowerment. However, other 
scholars and theologians I spoke with proposed that, although reforms to the Moudawana cannot 
entirely resolve issues of economic dependency, changes in inheritance and marital asset laws 
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could, at least partially, improve women’s financial stability. Dr. wadud explained that 
Malaysian family law ascribes a monetary value to woman’s contributions to maintaining the 
household. She proposes that a provision such as this one, grounded in Malaysian scholar’s 
interpretation of Islamic law in this context, could be applied to laws concerning the division of 
marital assets in Morocco. Through this transnational strategy, the ijtihad exercised by Islamic 
feminists could address the problems posed by economic dependency as women would be less 
afraid to exercise their rights without fear of economic destitution. Professor Rddad also 
articulated the ways in which Asma Lamrabet seeks to address Moroccan inheritance laws 
through feminist hermeneutics. Lamrabet advocates that laws must take into account the 
temporal context in which they will be implemented. For example, Professor Rddad explained 
that, according to the Qur’an, if you catch a thief stealing from you, you can cut off one of their 
feet and one of their hands. However, during the second caliphate, in light of widespread 
poverty, the caliph did not enforce this law. In this example, the caliph, a companion of the 
Prophet, did not implement the law based on a literal interpretation of the Qur’an based on 
contextual realities. Similarly, Lamrabet argues that, when the Qur’an was revealed, men carried 
sole responsibility for a family’s economy. Now, as a result of socio-economic transformations, 
both men and women participate in the job market. Therefore, Lamrabet advocates for the 
interpretation of Islamic law based on the economic realities of contemporary society. Ms. 
Chekrouni also asserted that because “women are acting and working exactly like men and 
providing for their families” inheritance laws can be changed to match this reality.  
 However, the experts I spoke with also outlined some of the challenges and limitations of 
the Islamic feminist movement. Dr. Eddouada articulated that, while Asma Lamrabet is popular 
within the Moroccan diaspora in Europe and Francophone Moroccans, she receives little 
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grassroots support. Professor Rddad also identified the Islamic feminist movement as elitist as a 
result of high illiteracy rates. Many Moroccans also view Lamrabet’s work, particularly on 
inheritance laws as far too radical. Furthermore, Manal Dao-Sabah claimed that even within elite 
circles, the Islamic feminist movement lacks a well-established organization and a uniform 
message. In the webinar I attended, the panelists also explained that established conservative 
Islamic scholars can easily dismiss these women’s work as a secular movement imported from 
the West rather than a serious hermeneutical practice. These accusations prevent average citizens 
from taking these women’s scholarship seriously.  
Conclusion 
 The 2004 Moudawana utilized ijtihad based on maqasid al-shari’a to increase women’s 
rights in Moroccan society. However, the regime instituted these reforms unilaterally and 
undemocratically and has largely failed to implement the majority of the reforms outlined in this 
new Family Code. The Islamic feminist movement combats both the neo-colonial imposition of 
secular Western feminism on Moroccan society and the patriarchy supported by conservative 
interpretations of Islamic law. Through Islamic feminism Moroccan Muslim women can 
establish their legal rights not in spite of but based on the values of Islam. I propose that this 
movement has the potential to provide a religious backing for further reforms to the Moudawana 
that would resolve barriers to implementation such as excessive judicial discretion and women’s 
lack of economic independence.  
 
Limitations of the Study 
I acknowledge that my positionality as a Western woman trained in secular, liberal frameworks 
may have influenced the direction of my research. I acknowledge that my personal beliefs 
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concerning individual rights might be at odds with the beliefs and desires of more traditional 
Moroccans, particularly those of traditional Moroccan women.  
 
Recommendations for Further Study 
I believe that research on this topic could be strengthened through a more in-depth analysis of 
how judges are applying the Moudawana throughout the country on a case-by-case basis. I 
would investigate the legal justification judges provide for their rulings, particularly in underage 
marriage and polygamy cases as well as cases involving the division of marital assets. I believe 
that such research would both demonstrate the sources of inconsistencies in interpretations 
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